(This document reflects my work as a person whose interest in his subject is unfortunately not matched by his knowledge of the language in which the vast majority of materials on the topic are written. Most of the background information was obtained through internet sites which unfortunately did not contain the kind of textual support required in more academic papers. Moreover, interviews were conducted through translators with varying degrees of proficiency in English, and so I did my best to piece things together as seemed logical. To the best of my knowledge, the arguments presented herein are supported by fact, and the facts are accurate.)
Choice, as certain philosophies dictate, is the cornerstone of a person’s ability to give an accurate expression of her will. Without that ability to choose, a person is denied the self-affirmation that comes with being an active agent in deciding her own destiny, or perhaps less dramatically, at least the course of the next few days. When the National Diet defeated a bill last year that would have granted suffrage in local elections to permanent residents with foreign nationalities, the law makers of Japan made a bold statement, whether they intended to or not, about what they thought about the right to choose.
Since the earliest modern political treatises of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the relationship between government and those under its sway has always been seen as a sort of agreement where each side surrenders something unto the other in exchange for something else. The people, for example, would give up part of their property in the form of taxes for the mutually advantageous goal of having the government guarantee the security of the rest of their property from the transgressions of others. Under Japanese law, all foreign nationals who reside in Japan must pay both national and local taxes, for which they receive certain benefits in exchange. While this fits the old standard model of how the political relationship is supposed to work, the idea of government has evolved quite a bit since the days of Locke and now accountability, transparency, and the notion of representing the interests of constituents have become key to a healthy, modern democracy. As can be expected, foreign nationals can not vote in either local or national elections, and consequently have no say in the policy-making that controls many aspects of their lives. There are strong policy reasons for this, which, despite certain shortcomings and perhaps a touch of xenophobia, make sense. However, the issue becomes extraordinarily complicated when it is extended to the sizable permanent resident with foreign nationalities population in Japan.
The very existence of such a group in Japan invites controversy, and with good cause. Historically, the people in this category may be pitied, viewed as the victims of imperialism and the evils associated with colonization. Today, they seem to be nothing more than a large thorn in the side and a nasty reminder that there are still some skeletons in the collective Japanese closet. To better appreciate the complexities of this issue, a little history is in order.
In the beginning of this century, vast numbers of people from the Japanese colonies (for the purposes of this article, I will focus on the ethnic Korean population) were either lured to Japan with promises of work, went there to escape the disastrous effects of colonization at home, were conscripted, or were forced to migrate to the Japanese isles in order to satisfy the needs of the imperial machine. As imperial subjects, those who lived in Japan were entitled to vote, be elected, and assume public office. This suffrage was shortlived, however, and with Japan’s defeat in World War II came the end of these civil rights. These people eventually lost their Japanese nationality and found themselves to be foreigners in a country in which they had previously been citizens, had spent much of their lives in, and perhaps had been born in.
One might wonder why an ethnic Korean would have elected to remain in Japan following the conclusion of World War II, and the answer is simple. Though the better part of the estimated 2,300,000 Koreans who were in Japan at the close of the war chose to return to Korea, about 500,000 to 600,000 decided to remain in Japan. For those who left, the choice was simple – Japan was nothing more than the enemy they had been temporarily forced to serve, and they wanted nothing more than to return home and start rebuilding their lives. Those who remained, however, were in large part Koreans who had come to Japan in their youth long before the war and who had set up their homes there in the hopes of starting anew. Their livelihood and now their families were based in Japan, and little, if anything, remained for them in Korea. Moreover, the instability back in Korea and the coming storm that eventually divided the peninsula all left them little choice but to remain in a land that hated them at worst, and looked down on them at best. Twice then, and in a relatively short span of time, choice had given way to necessity for these people. They were exiled to a state of metaphysical limbo where the principle of choice was suspended due to the harsh realities of life.
One question which is beyond the scope of this article, but would nonetheless be fascinating to explore, is how much reliance the Koreans who chose to stay placed on their continued status as Japanese nationals. The most likely answer is quite a lot, given that no one would choose to live in a society where her civil rights and nationality could be instantly stripped away. Because this loss of status as Japanese nationals happened with the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of April 28, 1952, a full 7 years after the end of the war, the Koreans in Japan may have a moral, if not legal, claim for redress under the reliance theory of damages. I am told that this doctrine exists in Japanese law, and because it most certainly is an international legal principle, the Japanese government should embrace this argument wholeheartedly. The government has shown a certain predilection for citing international law to demonstrate that some of its acts during the war (i.e. sexual slavery) were not technically illegal at the time, and so the government should extend this fondness for international law to the immediate redress of resident Koreans’ grievances concerning their suffrage. Therefore, perhaps those who lost their Japanese nationality as a result of the treaty should press for the restoration of all the rights and privileges they had come to rely on both before and after the war. But that is a topic for another day.
Eventually, special permanent residency status was awarded to those who had been stripped of their Japanese nationality as a result of the 1952 treaty, and to their descendants. Ever so slowly, and ever so reluctantly, the Japanese government has taken steps to reduce the official discrimination that it practices against Korean permanent residents, such as eventually eliminating the finger-printing requirement associated with alien registration that was the cause of much controversy. Still, stiff legal barriers bar the full and fair participation of Korean permanent residents in Japanese society, as evidenced by the refusal of the government to allow non-Japanese nationals to serve in most levels of the civil service, and in the absence of opportunities for Korean-language high school graduates to sit for Japanese university exams. This brings us to the issue at hand: voting rights for permanent residents with foreign nationalities.
The familiar American war cry of “No taxation without representation” may be somewhat simplistic in its logic, but nonetheless, it provides the proper backdrop to the Korean residents’ struggle to obtain voting rights in Japan. Since the restrictions on voting placed on other foreign nationals in Japan derive from their relatively recent (and voluntary) arrival in the country, it would be a travesty to place these same restrictions on people who have resided in the country for several generations. The proposed bill that was defeated in the National Diet last year was unfortunately plagued by the same misconceptions that abound concerning the nationality status of Koreans in Japan. A common perception is that Korean residents are divided into two nationalities, North Koreans and South Koreans. This is not the case. Under Japanese law, all residents of Korean descent are of one nationality – Korean. More likely than not, the confusion concerning Korean residents’ affiliation with either North or South Korea extends in large part from the Japanese government’s use of two separate markers on their Alien Registration Certificates. Originally, all Koreans were designated as affiliated with Chosen, or the Korean state before the Korean War. After relations with South Korea were normalized in 1965, the Japanese government allowed those who chose to do so to change their national affiliation to South Korea. In 1981, those Koreans who were still affiliated with the now-defunct Chosen state were also granted permanent resident status, but it would be a mistake to classify these people as North Korean nationals. Japan does not recognize the North Korean state and therefore could not issue Alien Registration Certificates in the name of a country that, at least for the Japanese government, does not exist. If anything, the perception that Chosen-affiliated Koreans are North Koreans may arise from some such Koreans’ participation in political groups that support the North Korean regime. However, political activism should not be confused with nationality — there is only one Korean nationality within Japan. Oddly, Korea is the only divided country that is treated as such. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the two Germanys were treated as one for the purpose of national identification of Germans in Japan. Even now, nationals of Taiwan and China are classified only as Chinese, so it is curious that the Japanese government would go to such lengths to list Koreans as nationals of two countries rather than one. It is important to note this disparity as we continue to examine the particular challenges in everyday life that confront Koreans as compared to people of other nationalities within Japan.
Though the exact figures on the percentage of Korean residents in favor of local suffrage differ according to the source, it appears that an overwhelming majority are in favor of receiving voting rights for local elections. One characteristic that seems rather uniform throughout the Korean resident population is a strong identification with the community in which they grew up. Though individuals in the group may have differing views about their attachment to Korea or Japan, they all seem to identify with their community as their true ‘motherland,’ and would prefer to think of themselves as say, Osakans, before as Japanese or Koreans. So, it comes as little surprise that first and foremost, most Koreans in Japan want a say in who governs them at the local level. To this end, on February 28, 1995, the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court recognized Constitutional support for the suffrage of permanent foreign residents. It held that the issue of suffrage on a local government level is a matter to be left to the National Diet to legislate. Moreover, in finding suffrage for permanent residents consistent with the Constitution, the Court recognized the close relationship that has developed between such people and the communities in which they live. Seeing as how they are active in local affairs and that they pay the same taxes as Japanese nationals, it would seem odd to deny them suffrage, especially where such suffrage would be in line with the Constitution. Is it fair to tax them without letting them voice their opinions at least to the local government?
Despite the general view among Korean residents that local suffrage would be desirable, there is a small but vocal minority that decries this idea as part of continuing attempts to assimilate them into Japanese society. These people regard any actions by the Japanese government concerning a change in their official status with suspicion, and perhaps justifiably so. We must remember that Koreans in Japan have undergone countless official attempts to eradicate their identity and cultural heritage, and so any governmental alteration in their status, no matter how small, might be seen as a justifiable reason for panic on their part. Even now, despite some changes in policy, the official government stance seems to be one of assimilation and elimination of any traces of cultural difference. This is reflected by such actions as the encouragement by government officials to adopt Japanese names upon naturalization.
In addition, granting local suffrage to permanent residents may simply be a hollow gesture on the government’s part which will endear it to the international human rights community, but ultimately do more harm than good to those it is supposed to benefit. For example, as things stand now, most observers realize that Koreans in Japan have no say in local governmental matters, and so any issues that negatively or disproportionately affect them can be freely criticized and lobbied against. Conversely, once local suffrage is granted, we may find that such laws and ordinances will have attained legitimacy since, technically, the Koreans’ voices were heard in their passage. Given the small percentage of Koreans within the Japanese population, they will more often than not make ineffective voting blocks, and allowing them the right to vote in local elections may do nothing more than legitimize legislation that might not otherwise see the light of day. Moreover, there are some who believe that the bill does not go far enough. Though permanent residents would be able to voice their opinions regarding who they wanted to represent them at the local level, they would not be able to run for those positions themselves. The logical corollary to allowing them to select their representatives would be to allow them to hold those same offices, for there is little difference between being allowed to vote and being allowed to hold office. In most democracies, the two ideas go hand in hand. Giving permanent residents local suffrage now could potentially block legislation that would give them greater civil rights in the future.
The current bills that have been proposed are also guilty of continuing to draw a false dichotomy between those Koreans classified as South Koreans and those who are affiliated with Chosen. Those affiliated with Chosen would be barred from voting under the proposed legislation, engendering ill will not only between them and the Japanese state, but also between them and South Korea-affiliated Koreans. Many Korean organizations oppose this legislation not because they do not favor local suffrage, but because it denies voting rights to a subgroup which is equally as deserving of those rights as any other group that is permanently resident in Japan.
As of October 1998, over 40.88% of all local governments had adopted resolutions requesting the suffrage of permanent residents for local elections. The Japanese people as a whole seem either indifferent towards this issue, or are nominally in favor of it. While this subject does not really concern them, the idea of national suffrage for permanent residents is an entirely different matter. With this, nationalist rhetoric about Japan being for ‘real’ Japanese takes center stage, and allowing anyone not ‘truly’ Japanese to have a say in the direction the nation should take is considered blasphemy. But that is an issue for another day, and though it perhaps would make sense for permanent residents to be granted national suffrage, it is uncertain whether many would vote, given their apparent alienation from matters of national importance. Suffice it to say that with regard to local suffrage for permanent residents, most Japanese would not mind it, or may even minimally support it.
Indeed, if the National Diet passes a subsequent version of last year’s bill, one last point that should be considered would be the government’s motivation in so doing. It appears that such an action on the part of the various political parties reveals a desire to press for the internationalization of Japan, and is more a gesture towards those who would become permanent residents than an apology to those who already are permanent residents. It is truly a sad state of affairs when the government refuses to admit that its actions should be an acknowledgement of and atonement for past wrongs, and instead glosses over the passage of such a monumental bill with rhetoric about future globalization.
In the final calculation of whether or not suffrage for local elections should be granted to permanent residents, the government should consider all the aforementioned points. First of all, the involuntary nature of the arrival of most Koreans into Japan must be remembered, as must the subsequent reluctance of most Koreans to become Japanese nationals. Even those who seek to become naturalized face stiff barriers before being granted citizenship, and even then, they may continue to find it difficult to fully assimilate into Japanese society. Moreover, there are possible negative ramifications that could stem from the passage of this bill, including the adverse effect of believing that permanent residents’ views are being represented where they are not, and the possible prevention of even greater civil rights legislation, such as the right to run for local office. In the end, however, the benefits that would accrue to both the permanent residents and to Japan itself outweigh the potential negative repercussions and advocate granting local suffrage, thus returning an element of choice and dignity to a people whose history revolves around the curtailment of their freedom.
Editor’s note:The bill to grant suffrage to foreign residents has not been adobted by diet yet untill now-Augusut 2001. The Liberal Democratic Party proposed another bill which unconditonally grants Japanese nationaliy to the special permanent residents with foreign nationality who lost their Japanse nationaliy under the San-Francisco Peace Treay(Actually they are the past residents or its decents of past Japanse colonies) when they applied. That bill raises controversy especially among the old comer society.